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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,
v.

Court of Appeals No.: 20150300

VICTORIA FANTON,

Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(e) and UT.
R. APP. P. 3 over this appeal from the Judgment, Sentence, S tqy of Execution

of Sentence,

Order of

Probation and Restitution, and Commitment, dated April 7, 2015, in Criminal No. 141500785;

Appellate Case No. 20150300, and the Judgment, Sentence, Stqy of Execution of Sentence, and Order

of Probation dated April 7, 2015, in Criminal No. 141500783; Appellate Case No. 20150301
(collectively the "Judgments"), by the Honorable Keith Barnes of the Fifth District Court,
Iron County, State of Utah, which Judgments sentenced Fanton to a prison term of one to
fifteen (1-15) years on each count, with a stay of the sentence in favor of jail time and
probation. A copy of the Judgments are both attached hereto as Addendum "A" and
incorporated herein by this reference.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying Fantonj- request to seroe
her remaining suspended sentence (approximate/y 184 df!YS) in three or four-dt!J
weekends so as to enable her to provide child care for her children?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This court "traditionally afford[s] the trial court wide
latitude and discretion in sentencing." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ,r 8, 40 P.3d 626. ''We will
reverse only if we detennine that a sentencing court has exceeded its permitted range of
discretion, or, stated differently, if we detennine that the trial court has 'failed to consider all
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that e~ceeds legally prescribed limits."' State v.

Moreno, 2005 UT App 200,

,rs,

113 P.3d 992, dting State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah

App. 1993). "Moreover, our decision is informed by the understanding that 'the exercise of
discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the [trial] court and
[we] can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the
view adopted by the trial court." Moreno at ,rs, dting Nuttall at 456 (first and third alterations
in original)(quotations and citation omitted).

PRESERVATION: At the sentencing herein, Fanton requested that she be allowed
to serve her remaining suspended sentence of one hundred and eighty-four (184) days, in
three (3) or four (4) day weekends in the Iron County Jail so as to enable her to care for her
minor children. The trial court denied such argument indicating that the charge was too
severe to allow such leniency.
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ISSUE II:

Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to request that Fanton be transferred to the
S fate of Michigan to serve her sentence so that her fami/y could help care for her
children while she was incarcerated?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for
the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I6, 89 P.3d
162, citing State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998).

PRESERVATION: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not reqwre
preservation where the record is adequate for review of the issue and the defendant has new
counsel on appeal. See, State v. Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 915 n. 3 (Utah App 1994)("ineffective
assistance claims raise for the first time on appeal can only be reviewed in 'unusual ...
peculiar, narrow circumstances."' (quoting State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah
1991)); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991)("Those circumstances exist
when there is new counsel on appeal and there is an adequate trial record ... ").

ISSUE III:

Was trial counsel inejfettive far failing to request a mental assessment be performed
on Fanton when the Presentence Investigation report (''PSI'? indicated that she had
been diagnosed with mental illness; or, alternativefy, did the trial court commit plain
error when it did not order a mental assessment based upon the PSI?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for
the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ,I6, 89 P.3d
162, citing State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998). In State v. Kennedy it states that,
"[t]he plain error standard of review requires an appellant to show the existence of a harmful
error that should have been obvious to the district court." Ibid., 2015 UT App. 152, ,I23, 354
P.3d 775, citing State v. Wate,jield, 2014 UT App 67, ,I18, 322 P.3d 1194.

PRESERVATION:

See, State v. Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 915 n. 3 (Utah App

1994)("ineffective assistance claims raise for the first time on appeal can only be reviewed in
3

'unusual ... peculiar, narrow circumstances.'" (quoting Stale v. Humphries, 818 P .2d 1027, 1029
(Utah 1991)); State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991)("Those circumstances
exist when there is new counsel on appeal and there is an adequate trial record ... ").

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. U.S. CONST. VI states as follows:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
B. UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-4-201 states as follows:
It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and
supervision of the child's natural parents. A child's need for a normal family
life in a permanent home, and for positive, nurturing family relationships is
usually best met by the child's natural parents. Additionally, the integrity of the
family unit and the right of parents to conceive and raise their children are
constitutionally protected.
C. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1(5) states as follows:

Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of
the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence
investigation report from the department or information from other sources
about the defendant. (b) The presentence investigation report shall include:
... (iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender
conducted under Section 77-18-1.1; ... (6)(a) The department shall provide the
presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant
if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three
working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the
sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 10 working days to
resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department.
4

D. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1.1(2) states as follows:
(2) On or after July 1, 2009, the courts of the judicial districts where the Drug
Offender Reform Act under Section 63M-7-305 is implemented shall, in
coordination with the local substance abuse authority regarding available
resources, order offenders convicted of a felony to: (a) participate in a
screening prior to sentencing; (b) participate in an assessment prior to
sentencing if the screening indicates an assessment to be appropriate; and (c)
participate in substance abuse treatment if: (i) the assessment indicates
treatment to be appropriate; (ii) the court finds treatment to be appropriate for
the offender; and (iii) the court finds the offender to be an appropriate
candidate for community-based supervision.
E. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-28a-1 states as follows:
The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve their
institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement,
treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the
policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a
basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such
offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and
operational costs. The purpose of this Compact is to provide for the mutual
development and execution of such programs of co-operation for the
confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most
economical use of human and material resources.
F. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a-501 states as follows:
As used in this part: (a) "Assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview
with a licensed mental health therapist: (i) used to determine if a person is in
need of: (A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse
program; (B) an educational series; or (C) a combination of Subsections
(l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and (ii) that is approved by the Division of Substance
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 29, 2014 Fanton was charged by Infarmation with Aggravated Robbery,
a first-degree felony, and Theft, a class B misdemeanor. (20150300) 1 R0001. In a separate

Infarmation also filed on December 29, 2014, Fanton was charged with Possession or Use of a
Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B
misdemeanor. (20150301) R0001. An Amended Infarmation was filed on January 21, 2015,
charging Fanton with Robbery, a second-degree felony, and Possession or Use of a
Controlled Substance, to wit: Heroin, a third-degree felony. (20150300) R0027; (20150301)
R0024. On January 21, 2015, the Statement of Defendant in Support ofGuil!J Plea and Certificate of

Counsel and Order ("Plea") was filed. (20150300) R0029. Under the Plea Fanton pied guilty
to Robbery, a second-degree felony, and Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, to
wit: Heroin, a third-degree felony. (20150300) R0030; (20150301) R0028. A Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report was filed on February 23, 2015. (20150300), R0040; (20150301) R0039.
The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report contained Fanton's mental history indicating that she
had been diagnosed with PTSD and bi-polar disorder.

(20150300) R0043; (20150301)

R0042.
On March 24, 2015 sentencing was held in this matter.

On April 7, 2015 the

Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Restitution and Commitment
was entered. (20150300) R0073.

In this Judgment Fanton was sentenced to one (1) to

fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison for her conviction of robbery. (20150300) R0074.
Fanton was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $10,000, a ninety percent (90%)
1 There are two (2) cases that have been consolidated into this one appeal. 20150300 refers to the record for trial
court no. -0785 and 20150301 refers to the record for trial court no. -0783.
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surcharge, and a court security fee in the amount of thirty-three dollars ($33). Id. This
sentence was to be served concurrently with the sentence in case no. 1415000785. Id. This
sentence was stayed in favor of probation.

(20150300) R007 5.

Under the terms of

probation Fanton was to execute a formal agreement with Adult Probation and Parole and
report to them as ordered, break no laws during her probation, serve two hundred and
seventy-two (272) days in the Iron County jail with credit for time served, pay a fine in the
amount of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) plus a court security fee in the amount of thirtythree dollars ($33) dollars, pay restitution, obtain a substance abuse evaluation and file such
report with the court within sixty (60) days, reimburse Iron County four hundred dollars
($400) for her public defender, not use or possess illegal substances, not associate with
persons who use illegal substances, write a brief plan of what her life would be like in one
(1), five (5), and ten (10) years from now and give it to her probation officer, maintain fulltime employment or be in full-time school or a combination of both, complete twenty (20)
hours a week of community service for every week she is not employed, and not reside
\

outside the State of Utah. (20150300) R0077.
On April 7, 2015 the Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution, and Order of Probation was
entered. (20150301) R0067. Fanton was sentenced to one (1) to fifteen (15) years in the
Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine plus a ninety percent (90%) surcharge
and court security fee in the amount of thirty-three dollars ($33). This sentence was to be
served concurrently with the sentence in case no. 1415000783.

This sentence was stayed

and Fanton was ordered to serve 270 days in the county jail and thirty-six (36) months of
probation thereafter. The conditions of probation were that Fanton would report as ordered
7

to Adult Probation and Parole, commit no law violations, pay the court security fee of thirtythree dollars ($33), and follow the other terms of probation as set forth in case no.
141500783.
On April 13, 2015, the Notice

of Appeal

and Notice

of Substitution of

Counsel and

Withdrawal was filed. (20150300) R0080; (20150301) R0073. Fanton's trial counsel, Jeffery
E. Slack withdrew and was replaced by Matthew Carling. Id. On May 15, 2015 the court
received a letter from Fanton asking that her plea be reviewed and that she be released to
treatment. (20150301) R0087. The Court denied the request on May 12, 2015. (20150301)
R0091. On May 26, 2015 a hearing was held regarding Fanton's request to withdraw her
plea. (20150300) R0105; (20150301) R0096. At such hearing the trial court determined that
her plea was entered voluntarily and that her request to withdraw was not made timely. The
trial court thus denied her request. Id.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Plea and Sentencing Hearing January 21, 2015 and March 24, 2015

At the plea hearing the State indicated that it was not seeking prison time, that
Fanton would cooperate with any prosecution of her co-defendants, and that she was not
being pressured into entering a guilty plea in both cases. (20150300) R0103:3; (20150301)
R0097:3. Fanton indicated she was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and was
taking no medication. Id. at p. 4. Fanton indicated she had no disabilities and nothing
would interfere with her ability to enter into the agreement. Id. Fanton indicated to the
court that she had reviewed the Amended Information and the plea agreement. Id. Fanton
indicated that she understood the terms of the agreements. Id. Fanton pied guilty to the
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robbery charge and to possession of a controlled substance. Id. at p. 5. The trial court
found that there was a sufficient factual basis and that Fanton made her pleas knowingly and
voluntarily. Id.

B. Sentencing Hearing on March 24, 2015
Fanton's attorney indicated that he and Fanton had reviewed the PSI. (20150300)
R104:2; (20150301) R8:2. Fanton's counsel indicated that they had no issues with the PSI
except the credit for the eighty-six (86) days she had already served. Id. at p. 3. Fanton's
attorney also argued that Fanton should be allowed to serve her sentence in three or four (34) day blocks of time so that she could care for her children and resolve other legal matters
still pending in Washington County. Id. The State indicated it did not believe a sentence of
two hundred and seventy days (270) should be served in three or four (3-4) day blocks and
declined Fanton's request. Id at p. 4. The trial court then sentenced Fanton to one (1) to
fifteen (15) years on the robbery charge and a ten thousand dollar ($10,000) fine with a
ninety percent (90%) surcharge and thirty-three dollars ($33) court security fee and zero (0)
to five (5) years on the possession charge with a fine of five thousand dollars ($5,000),
(ninety percent) 90% surcharge and a thirty-three dollar ($33) court security fee. Id.

Both

cases were to run concurrently with one another. Id. The court then stayed such sentences
in favor of 270 days in the county jail and thirty-six (36) months of probation. Id. As a
condition of her probation Fanton was given credit for time already served and was ordered
to pay one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) in fees and a sixty-six dollar ($66) court
security fee. Id. Fanton was also ordered to pay restitution. Id. Fanton was to pay four
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hundred dollars ($400) to the Iron County Attorney's Office for the services of her defense
attorney. Id. Fanton accepted the trial court's terms of probation. Id. at p. 6.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
At Fanton's sentencing she requested that her remaining suspended sentence of one
hundred and eighty-four (184) days be served in three to four (3-4) day increments so she
could continue to care for her children. The trial court erred in denying this request because

it was a mitigating circumstance that should have been considered by the court~ The trial
court did not even consider this request but just stated it believed it was not appropriate for
a suspended sentence of that length. This denial violated Fanton's due process rights because
the court did not act on relevant information in passing sentence.
Fanton's counsel was also ineffective because he did not request that she be
transferred to Michigan to serve her sentence so that her family could help care for her
children and she could continue to have a relationship with them. His failure to do this
caused his performance to fall below the reasonable objective professional standard and
prejudiced Fanton because it did not allow her to have family help with her children or be
able to continue a relationship with them.
Fanton's counsel was also ineffective for not objecting to the PSI when it indicated
that Fanton had been diagnosed with PTSD and bi-polar disorder, and he made no request
for a mental assessment prior to sentencing.

This fell below the reasonable objective

professional standard and prejudiced Fanton because she was sentenced without the trial
court taking into consideration her mental illnesses.
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Alternatively, the trial court committed plain error in this matter because it did not
order that a mental assessment be completed prior to sentencing when it was aware of
Fanton's mental illnesses after reading the PSI. Its failure to do so prejudiced Fanton
because a mental assessment and its diagnosis would have greatly impacted her sentence.
The trial court was aware of the existence of such illnesses and did nothing to further
investigate them. Thus, Fanton was prejudiced as is discussed further below.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
FANTON'S REQUEST TO SERVE HER REMAINING SUSPENDED
SENTENCE IN THREE OR FOUR DAY WEEKENDS SO SHE
COULD PROVIDE CHILD CARE FOR HER CHILDREN BECAUSE
IT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THIS MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
"Due process 'requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant

information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence."' State v. Bowers, 2012 UT App. 353,
,I12, 292 P.3d 711, dting State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). ''The Sentencing

Matrix compare[s] a defendant's criminal history assessment' score with the degree of the
offense of which he ha[s] been convicted." State v. Harory, 2015 UT App 92, ,I3, -- P.3d --,
dting State v. Egbert, 748 P .2d 558, 561-62 (Utah 1987). Harory continues as follows:
The Sentencing Matrix 'creates a starting point' for sentencing judges by
'reflect[ing] a recommendation for a typical case,' but judges are not bound by
the recommendations and are to take both 'aggravating and mitigating
circumstances' into account, along with other pertinent considerations,
when making sentencing decisions." Id. at ,I3; see Utah Sentencing
Commission, 2014 Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines 1, available at
http:/www.sentencing.utah.gov.

Id. "In general, trial courts base sentencing decisions on 'the totality of the circumstances."'
State v. Sanchez, 2015 UT App 58, iJ9, -- P.3d --, dting State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ,Il 17, 322
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P .3d 624. "Although courts must consider all legally relevant factors in making a sentencing
decision, not all aggravating and mitigating factors are equally important, and [o]ne factor in
mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale." Id.,

quoting State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ,r59, 191 P.3d 17 (alteration in original)(citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). "This should not be read to mean that the trial court's
sentencing decision is beyond review. The trial court is charged with identifying, on the
record, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that affect its sentencing decision,
because '[s]entencing should be conducted with full information and with careful
deliberation of all relevant factors."' Moreno at ,I10, citing State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300
(Utah 1993). "A trial court's failure to discharge this duty will result in the case being
remanded for resentencing with instructions that the trial court consider all of the
circumstances relevant to the sentencing decision." Id., citing Strunk at 1300. In State v.

Beltran-Felix it states that, "Utah case law 'require[s] trial courts to set forth, on the record,
aggravating and mitigating factors, ... "' Ibid., 922 P.2d 30, 37 (Utah App 1996)(citing State v.

Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989); State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 60 (Utah 1988)).
"[A]ny mitigating or aggravating circumstance found by the trial court must be
supported by evidence, and the proponent of the circumstance bears the burden of proving
its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App 200, ,r13,
113 P.3d 992; if. United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir.1990).

"[A]ggravating

and mitigating factors are primarily concerned with "the nature and circumstances of the
crime" and "the defendant's character, background [or] history." State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT
1, ,r105, 63 P.3d 731; UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-207(2)(a)(i-ii). Black's Law Dittionary defines
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"mitigating circumstances" as "[s]uch as do not constitute a justification or excuse for the
offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or
reducing the degree of moral culpability." Ibid., 6th Edition, West Publishing 1991, p. 693.

In State v. Undsey the court discusses what makes up an appropriate sentence as
follows:
A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light
of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of
society which underlie the criminal justice system." State v. McCJendon, 611 P.2d
728, 729 (Utah 1980). Thus, "the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence." UTAH CODE.ANN. §77-18-1(7).
Ibid, 2014 UT App 288, 340 P.3d 176. ''The Supreme Court of the United States' holding in
United States v. Booker, 'requires a sentencing court to consider Guideline ranges, but it
permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well."' U.S. v.
Hernandez-Castillo, 2007 WL 1302577, *2 (D.N.M. 2007). The Court recognized that "[u]nder
the new advisory Guideline scheme, 'district courts have a freer hand in determining
sentences."' Id., dting United States v. Trujillo-Ten-azas, 405 F.3d 814, 819 (10 th Cir. 2005).
Personal family circumstances do allow for a variance in sentencing as is set forth in
U.S. v. Hernandez-Castillo as follows:
Hernandez-Castillo argues that, even if his personal family circumstances do
not warrant a downward departure under the Guidelines, they do counsel for a
variance from the guideline sentence consistent with the Court's authority
under United States v. Booker. Hernandez-Castillo has cited a case from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and one from a district
court within the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that
suggest family circumstances are a factor that a sentencing court may consider
in its analysis under United States v. Booker. See Sentencing Memorandum at 3
(dting United States v. Bernal-Aveja, 414 F.3d 625, 628-29 (6th
Cir.2005)(remanding to district court for consideration of whether defendant's
explanation that he reentered the United States to be closer to his four
13

American-born children residing in Ohio warranted a variance); United States v.
Galvez-Barrios, 355 F.Supp.2d 958, 964 (E.D.Wisc.2005)(granting a variance
from the guideline sentence, because, in part, the court "considered it
significant that defendant returned to the United States to be with and support
his family, not to commit crimes or for purely economic reasons").
The Court agrees that a defendant's family circumstances may reflect upon his
personal characteristics in a manner that becomes relevant to sentencing.

Ibid., 2007 WL 1302577.
In the instant matter, Fanton requested that the trial court allow her to serve her
sentence in three (3) or four (4) day blocks of time so that she could still care for her
children and maintain her relationship with them. The trial court did not take this request
into consideration or grant such request when they sentenced Fanton, although such
information was relevant to this matter. Bowers at if12.
Under Harory, Fanton's criminal history assessment score must be compared with the
degree of the offense of which she has been convicted. Id. at iJ3. Harory indicates that the
sentencing matrix creates a starting point for the trial judge by giving them a
recommendation and that they are to take both aggravating and mitigating circumstances
into account.

Id.

In general, sentencing decisions are based on the totality of the

circumstances and all legally relevant factors must be considered. Id. However, any factor of
mitigating or aggravating circumstances may be given more consideration than another. Id.
Mitigating factors are those which are concerned with the defendant's character and
background. Arguelles at if105.

Fanton's child care circumstances are mitigating as she had

no family to care for her children. By serving three-four (3-4) days at a time, Fanton could
still care for her children and spend time with them. The young age of her children makes

14

her being with them even more important. This factor should have been considered when it
was detennined how Fanton's sentence should be served.
All mitigating or aggravating factors must be placed on the record at sentencing.
Beltran-Felix at p. 21.

The trial court failed to consider the mitigating circumstance of

Fanton's child care in passing its sentence. At the sentencing hearing Fanton's attorney
asked the court if she could serve her sentence in three to four day increments so that she
could care for her children. The court responded that it did not think a two hundred seventy
(270) day sentence could be served that way and made no consideration of the mitigating
factor. The court did not discuss or make any other mention of this request on the record.

It hyper-focused on the length of her sentence to defeat consideration of any other possible
solution based on the mitigating evidence and request. The court's failure to do so was not
in compliance with Harof!Y or Beltran-Felix.
Fanton presented evidence to the court that supported her mitigating circumstances.
Moreno at ,I13. She told the court why her sentenced should be served in three-four (3-4) day
increments, yet the court paid no attention. Without any justifiable reason, the court simply
refused her request. In doing so the court has shown that it is more concerned about one
factor rather than the totality of the circumstances, failing entirely to consider Fanton's
children's best interests.

It is not uncommon for courts to consider family circumstances in sentencing. Booker
required the trial court herein to consider not only Guideline ranges, but other statutory
concerns as well. Hernandez-Castillo at *2. The trial court failed to recognize that it had a freer
hand in determining sentences. Id., dting Trujillo-Te"azas at 819. In Bernal-Avqa, the 6th Circuit
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remanded to district court for consideration of whether defendant's desire to be closer to his
four American-born children residing in Ohio warranted a variance. Id. at 628-29. In Galvez-

Barrios, another court granted a variance where the defendant desired to be with and support
his family, rather than to commit crimes or for purely economic reasons. Id. at 964. In

Hernandez-Castillo, the Court agreed that a defendant's family circumstances may reflect upon
his personal characteristics, which is relevant to sentencing. However, the trial court herein
did not acknowledge the request at all, but rather stated that the sentence was too long to be
able to order a variance. This is contrary to its duty to consider the totality of the
circumstances.
Furthermore, Fanton's sentence must be appropriate based upon her background and
the crime she committed while it also serves to protect society. Lindsey at ,I12. Fanton
provided the court with information as to why she would serve her sentence in three or four
(3-4) day blocks of time and why that should be part of her sentence. Id. While Fanton's
actual sentence was likely appropriate for her background and crime, her reasons for
changing how she served her sentence were not considered by the court. The court simply
said it did not think it was possible to serve her sentence that way. It held no discussion on
the matter. It did not take into consideration her family circumstances although it is clear
that courts are directed to do so as a factor in sentencing. See, Bernal-Ave.fa at 628-29; Galvez-

Barrios at 964; Hernandez-Castillo. Family circumstances are grounds for a variation in
sentencing and thus, the trial court erred in its sentencing of Fanton.

16

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO
HAVE FANTON TRANSFERRED TO MICHIGAN TO SERVE HER
SENTENCE WHERE SHE HAD FAMILY THAT COULD HELP
WITH HER CHILDREN DURING HER INCARCERATION.

II.

UTAH CODE

ANN.

§77-28a-1 states the purpose of the Interstate Corrections

Compact ("ICC") between states regarding inmates, as follows:
The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize and improve their
institutional facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement,
treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders, declare that it is the
policy of each of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a
basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such
offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital expenditures and
operational costs. The purpose of this Compact is to provide for the mutual
development and execution of such programs of co-operation for the
confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders with the most
economical use of human and material resources.
(Emphasis added). In Glick v. Holden our appellate courts discuss the ICC in more detail as
follows:
The ICC was adopted in Utah in 1959 to "improve the range of institutional
facilities, confinement, treatment, and rehabilitation programs available for
offenders incarcerated by its member states." Gibson v. Morris, 646 P.2d 733,
734 (Utah 1982); see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-28a-1 to -5 (1990). An inmate
may request a transfer to take advantage of programs offered in other states or
to be closer to family members.

Ibid., 889 P.2d 1389, 1390 (UT App. 1995).
Although located in an area of the code not applicable to these proceedings, a child's
best interests under UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-4-201 is legally described as follows:

It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and
supervision of the child's natural parents. A child's need for a normal family
life in a permanent home, and for positive, nurturing family relationships is
usually best met by the child's natural parents. Additionally, the integrity of the
family unit and the right of parents to conceive and raise their children are
constitutionally protected.
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A parent's fundamental right to have a relationship with their child is stated as follows:
It is widely recognized that "[a] parent has a fundamental right, protected by
the Constitution, to sustain his relationship with his child." In re J.P., 648 P.2d
1364, 1372 (Utah 1982) (quotations and citation omitted); see also QuiJ/oin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978)
(recognizing the relationship between parent and child as constitutionally
protected). This "freedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255, 98 S.Ct. at 555 (alteration in original)
(quotations and citation omitted); see also In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307,if 12, 37
P.3d 1166 (recognizing parents' interest in the care, custody, and control of
their children as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment). Therefore, we must ensure that" 'the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents."' In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1372 (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438,442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)

State ex. rel A.H., 2004 UT App 39, if10, 86 P.3d 745.
A parties' right to the effective assistance of counsel is outlined in Stale v. Houston as
follows:
The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution includes "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." In
Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court announced the twopart test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, the defendant must
show that "his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment." Second, the defendant must demonstrate
"that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." We have
acknowledged "the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and]
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant." As a result, "we must indulge in a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance, and that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.

Ibid., 2015 UT 40, if70, 353 P.3d 55.

In the instant matter, Fanton's counsel was ineffective because he did not ask that
Fanton be transferred to Michigan so that she could serve her sentence close to family who
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could help care for her children. Thus, allowing her fundamental right to a relationship with
the children and the best interests of the children to be ignored.
Under the ICC, the transferring of Fanton would have properly considered not only
her best interests, but those of her family, and more particularly her children. UTAH CODE
ANN. §77-28a-1; Glick at 1390. Fanton's attorney should have requested she be transferred
to Michigan so she could maintain a relationship with her children.

This could occur

because she would have relatives caring for her children who would foster this relationship
during her incarceration. As the legal concept is set forth under UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-4201, it is in the best interests and welfare of Fanton's children to be raised under her care
and supervision. Relatives would care for the children during her incarceration and she
would then resume their care immediately upon her release. Fanton has a fundamental right
under the Constitution to sustain a relationship with her children. A.H. at ,It 0. If the
children went to Michigan and Fanton stayed here with no particular ties to Utah, it would
impede her relationship with them.
Fanton's counsel did not raise this matter before the court. He made mention of her
wanting to serve her sentence in small increments to care for the children but did not ask the
court to transfer her to Michigan to serve her sentence where she had family to assist with
the children. Fanton has a constitutional right to raise her children which her attorney did
not protect.
Under Houston, to prove counsel was ineffective Fanton must prove that her
counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment and that she was prejudiced by such performance. Id. at iJ70. His
19

failure to raise the issue of transferring her to Michigan for her children fell below the
reasonable standard of professional judgment. Id. He failed to protect her constitutional
rights. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; J.P. at 1372; see also Qui/Join, 434 U.S. at 255, 98 S.Ct. at
554-5; see also SA. at ,r 12; A.H. at ,I10. Had he made this request, it likely would have been
granted and her relationship with her children would have been sustained and maintained.
Thus, Fanton's counsel was ineffective, and the Judgments should be reversed.

III.

FANTON'$
COUNSEL
WAS
INEFFECTIVE
FOR
NOT
REQUESTING THAT AN ASSESSMENT BE CONDUCTED UPON
RECEIPT OF THE PSI THAT DISCLOSED FANTON'S MENTAL
ILLNESS;
OR,
ALTERNATIVELY,
THE
TRIAL
COURT
COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING TO REQUIRE THE
MANDATORY ASSESSMENT BE CONDUCTED BY AP&P.

Under State v. Thurston it discusses why a judge should be provided background
information on the defendant at sentencing as follows:
Utah law contemplates that the sentencing judge be provided with complete
background information on the defendant and the crime so that he or she
might impose a sentence more intelligently. For example, UTAH CODE ANN.
§64--13-20(1)(b) (1986) (amended 1989) requires the Department of
Corrections to "provide investigative functions and prepare reports to assist
the courts in sentencing functions," including the provision for
"recommendations concerning appropriate measures to be taken on behalf of
offenders."

Ibid., 781 P.2d 1296, 1299 (UT App. 1989). UTAH CODE .ANN. §77-18-1.1(2) indicates as
follows:

•

On or after July 1, 2009, the courts of the judicial districts where the Drug
Offender Reform Act under Section 63M-7-305 is implemented shall, in
coordination with the local substance abuse authority regarding available
resources, order offenders convicted of a felony to: (a) participate in a
screening prior to sentencing; (b) participate in an assessment prior to
sentencing if the screening indicates an assessment to be appropriate; and (c)
participate in substance abuse treatment if: (i) the assessment indicates
treatment to be appropriate; (ii) the court finds treatment to be appropriate for
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the offender; and (iii) the court finds the offender to be an appropriate
candidate for community-based supervision.
UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a-501 defines "assessment" as follows:
As used in this part: (a) "Assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview
with a licensed mental health therapist: (i) used to determine if a person is in
need of: (A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse
program; (B) an educational series; or (C) a combination of Subsections
(l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and (ii) that is approved by the Division of Substance
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105.
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1 (5) states as follows:
Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of
the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence
investigation report from the department or information from other sources
about the defendant. (b) The presentence investigation report shall include:
... (iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender
conducted under Section 77-18-1.1; ... (6)(a) The department shall provide the
presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant
if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three
working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the
department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the
sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional 10 working days to
resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department.
A parties' right to the effective assistance of counsel is discussed in State v. Houston as
follows:
The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution includes "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." In
Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court announced the twopart test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. First, the defendant must
show that "his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment." Second, the defendant must demonstrate
"that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." We have
acknowledged "the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and]
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant." As a result, "we must indulge in a strong presumption that
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counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance, and that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.
2015 UT 40, ,I70, 353 P.3d 55. ''The party seeking the benefit of the plain error exception
"must demonstrate that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (tli) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome." Meadow Valley Contradors, Inc. v. State Dept. ofTransp., 2011 UT 35,

,Il 7,266 P.3d 671.
Herein, a PSI was prepared for both of Fanton's cases. It indicated that Fanton had
been diagnosed with PTSD and bi-polar disorder. Although armed with this information, no
drug or mental assessment was performed or even determined to be unnecessary. Fanton's
counsel should have noted this information and objected to the PSI, requesting that the
mandatory assessments be conducted on Fanton prior to sentencing.
The trial court herein was not provided with complete background information on
Fanton so as to be able to "impose [her] sentence more intelligently." Thurston at 1299. The
Department of Corrections has a duty to "provide investigative functions and prepare
reports to assist the courts in sentencing functions" including conducting assessments where
it is clear that one is needed. Id. The Drug Offender Reform Act under §63M-7-305 was
implicated herein requiring that Fanton be submitted to screening prior to sentencing,
having plead to a felony charge. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1.1(2). It appears some sort of
screening occurred through AP&P since the PSI indicates the mental health and drug issues
faced by Fanton; however, there is no indication as to their findings regarding a needed
assessment or substance abuse treatment and the appropriateness of those resources for
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Fanton. Id. Having provided insufficient information in the PSI, the trial court was not only
lacking in complete information to make a more intelligent decision in sentencing Fanton,
but also unable to find whether treatment or community-based supervision would have been
appropriate for Fanton or not.
An in-depth clinical interview with a licensed mental health therapist would have
been appropriate given the drug charges and Fanton's PTSD and bi-polar disorder. UTAH
CODE ANN. §41-6a-501(a). Since PTSD and bi-polar can be treated with medication and

therapy, it was necessary to provide sufficient information to the court as to Fanton's
existing access to resources during the commission of the crimes to determine her mental
health impact on having committed them. Thurston at 1299. It is quite possible that the
results of an assessment would have found Fanton eligible for release into either drug or
mental health treatment or community-based supervision. UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6a501 (a)(i).
The court was capable of continuing the date for the imposition of sentence if
Fanton's counsel had spoken up after receiving the PSI about the lack of assessment for his
client who was diagnosed with PTSD and bi-polar disorder. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1(5).
The PSI was statutorily required to contain information from other sources about Fanton,
including any screenings or assessments. Id. However, none were listed in the PSI as having
occurred.
Upon receiving the PSI, Fanton's counsel had the duty to review it for inaccuracies,
immediately contacting AP&P and the State's attorney in an attempt to resolve them. UTAH
CODE ANN. §77-18-1(6)(a). If no resolution could be reached, the matter should have been
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presented to the trial court, which court maintained authority to grant an additional 10
working days to resolve them. Id. However, with it being an assessment that was omitted, it
likely would have taken a longer period of time than 10 days to conduct the proper
assessments on Fanton. This is precisely why AP&P is statutorily directed to conduct them
without court order and include them in the PSI. The PSI was thus rendered deficient by
them not having done so, with Fanton's counsel egregiously supporting the lack of
information being presented to the trial court by failing to request it.
Fanton's right to counsel is protected under the Sixth Amendment. Houston at ,I70.
Fanton's counsel rendered deficient performance by not requiring AP&P to abide the
statutes directing that a screening and assessment be conducted on his client who plead to
drug charges and suffered with a mental illness.

Id. The code is clear on this matter;

however, counsel overlooked it to Fanton's prejudice. Id. Such egregious omission is
demonstrated by the record wherein Fanton's counsel accepted the PSI, only requesting
application of credit for time served. Id. This fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment. Id. It is not within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance to allow AP&P to present only partial information, and exclude significant
information with regard to a client's mental health that could impact sentencing. Id. There is
no sound trial strategy that would support keeping Fanton's mental health informationwhich is by nature mitigating-from a court prior to sentencing. Id.
Alternatively, the trial court should have recognized the error and corrected it.

Meadow Valley Conlra1,tors at 1J17. An error clearly existed in failing to hold AP&P to the
statutes governing the process and contents of Fanton's PSI, upon which the trial court
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relied heavily herein. Id The trial court is charged with application of the statutory
requirements pertaining to PSis and sentencing and, upon reviewing the PSI that indicated
Fanton suffered from a mental illness, should have at a minimum discussed it on the record
through inquiring of the State why it was absent. Id
The error should have been obvious to the trial court. Meadow Valley Contrat1ors at

,I17. Such error significantly harmed Fanton since it had a direct impact on the information
upon which the trial court relied in sentencing. Id She would likely have been eligible for
release to treatment, a lesser sentence due to the mitigating circumstances of her mental
illness (providing her the requested relief of serving 3-4 day increments challenged supra), or
even a suspension in favor of community-based supervision only. See, UTAH CODE ANN.
§41-6a-501(a)(i). Instead, Fanton was ordered to serve one year in the county jail, with
probation to follow.
Fanton's counsel was aware of her mental illnesses as soon as he looked at the PSI.
This told him that an assessment needed to be done prior to sentencing. He failed to
request one. This failure prejudiced Fanton because she was sentenced without any
accounting of her mental state or how such state may have affected her plea or her
sentencing. Id. Had her counsel objected and requested an assessment, her mental illness
would have been addressed in sentencing-as it should have been-providing the court with
full information to determine her sentence and appropriate treatment. Thus, her counsel
was ineffective because of his failure to object and request the mandatory assessment under
the code. Alternatively, the trial court committed plain error in the same regard, having just
as much knowledge of the omission in the PSI as Fanton's counsel, and being charged with
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upholding the statutory process for PSis and sentencing. Either way, the Judgments need to
be reversed and the matter remanded with direction that the PSI be corrected with the
appropriate assessments conducted and addressing Fanton's mental health and drug issues.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Fanton respectfully requests that this
Court reverse both the Judgment, Sentence, Stay

of Execution of Sentence,

Order of Probation and

Restitution, and Commitment, dated April 7, 2015 and the Judgment, Sentence, Stay

of Execution of

Sentence, and Order of Probation dated April 7, 2015, and take any such further action as this
Court deems necessary.

DATED this 2nd day of October, 2015.

Matthew Carling
Attorney for Victoria Fanton
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Addendum ,...,,A,...,,
Judgment, Sentence, Stay ofExecution ofSentence, Order ofProbation and
Restitution, and Commitment, dated April 7, 2015, in Criminal No.
141500785; Appellate Case No. 20150300,

and
Judgment, Sentence, Stay ofExecution ofSentence, and Order ofProbation
dated April 7, 2015, in Criminal No. 141500783;
Appellate Case No. 20150301.
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The Order of Court is stated below:
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G. TYLER ROMERIL (#11954)
Deputy Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite 201
P.O. Box428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5310

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, ORDER
OF PROBATION AND RESTITUTION,
AND COMMITMENT

vs.
VICTORIA FANTON,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 141500783
Judge Keith Barnes

The Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense of
ROBBERY, a Second-Degree Felony; on January 21, 2015, and the Court having accepted said
plea of guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a Presentence Investigation
Report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter
having come on for sentencing on March 24, 2015, in Cedar City, Utah, and the Defendant,
VICTORIA FANTON, having appeared in person, together with her attorney of record Jeffery E.
Slack, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Deputy Iron County Attorney G.
Tyler Romeril, and the Court having reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and the file
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in detail, and thereafter having heard statements from all parties, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, Stay of
Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Restitution, and Commitment as follows:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to her plea of guilty, has been convicted of the offense of
ROBBERY, a Second-Degree Felony; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had
anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to
the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as
charged and convicted.

SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to
her conviction of ROBBERY, a Second-Degree Felony, shall serve a term of imprisonment for a
period of one ( 1) to fifteen ( 15) years in the Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby
placed in the custody of the Utah Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to
her conviction of ROBBERY, a Second-Degree Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum and amount
often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus a ninety percent (90%) surcharge, and a court security fee
in the sum and amount of thirty-three dollars ($33).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be served
concurrently with the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 141500785.
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STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the tenns of incarceration imposed and
the fines imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
compliance with the following tenns and conditions of probation.
ORDER OF PROBATION AND RESTITUTION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
VICTORIA FANTON, is hereby placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months under
the supervision of the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, strictly within the
following terms, provisions, and conditions:
1.

The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by

the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation set forth
herein, shall strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same are
hereby made a part of this Order by means of incorporation.
2.

The Defendant shall report as ordered and required by the Court and the

Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation.
3.

The Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this probation.

4.

The Defendant shall serve a term of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a

period of two hundred and seventy (270) days with credit for time served.
5.

The Defendant shall pay a fine and fee in the amount of one thousand five

hundred dollars ($1,500), plus a court security fee in the amount of thirty-three dollars ($33),
during the period of probation and under the direction of Adult Probation and Parole. Further,
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the Defendant may receive credit towards the fine for costs associated with the successful
completion of a substance abuse evaluation and recommended aftercare, as long as she
successfully completes probation without any violations.
6.

The Defendant shall pay restitution to the victims in this matter, (1) Suman Singh,

in the sum and amount of one hundred and ninety-two dollars ($192); and (2) Lindsay Hold,
Altius Health Plans, in the sum and amount of one hundred and fifty dollars ($150). Said
restitution to be paid joint and several with the co-Defendants in this matter and paid under the
direction of Adult Probation and Parole.
7.

The Defendant shall obtain a substance abuse evaluation and file the substance

abuse evaluation report with the Court within sixty (60) days. Further, the Defendant shall enter,
complete, and pay for any and all aftercare recommended as a result of said evaluation.
8.

The Defendant shall reimburse Iron County four hundred dollars ($400) for costs

associated with the public defender.
9.

The Defendant shall not consume or possess illegal narcotics or mind-altering

substances, including marijuana and any synthetic forms thereof, nor associate with people that
consume or possess said substances.
10.

The Defendant shall not consume or possess alcohol, nor visit establishments

where alcohol is the chief item of sale or where consumption of alcohol is the primary activity.
Further, the Defendant shall not consume or possess energy drinks, other drinks, or medications
that contain alcohol.
11.
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and all treatment providers of mental and/or physical health to the Office of Adult Probation and
Parole and the Iron County Attorney's Office.
12.

The Defendant shall write a brief plan to be presented to her probation officer

detailing where she envisions her life 1, 5, and 10 years from now. Said plan to be submitted
within thirty (30) days.
13.

The Defendant shall maintain full-time employment, be enrolled in school full-

time, or a combination of both, during the period of probation.
14.

The Defendant shall complete twenty (20) hours of community service per week

if she is unemployed for more that three (3) weeks until full time employment is gained.
15.

The Defendant shall not establish residence outside the State of Utah without an

approved Interstate Compact or travel outside the State without an approved Travel Permit from
Adult Probation and Parole.
16.

The Defendant is hereby notified that there shall be zero tolerance for any

probation violations.

COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and
deliver her to the Iron County Jail in Cedar City, Utah, there to be kept and confined in
accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence,
Order of Probation and Restitution, and Commitment.

END OF ORDER
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G. TYLER ROMERIL (#11954)
Deputy Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite 201
P.O. Box428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5310

1N THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, AND
ORDER OF PROBATION

vs.

VICTORIA FANTON,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 141500785
Judge Keith Barnes

The Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense of
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third-Degree Felony; on
January 21, 2015, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty and thereafter having
ordered the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report, and after said report was prepared
and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having come on for sentencing on March
24, 2015, in Cedar City, Utah, and the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, having appeared in
person, together with her attorney of record Jeffery E. Slack, and the State of Utah having
appeared by and through Deputy Iron County Attorney G. Tyler Romeril, and the Court having
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reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and the file in detail, and thereafter having heard
statements from all parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and
enters the following Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, and Order of Probation
as follows:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to her plea of guilty, has been convicted of the offense of
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third-Degree Felony; and the
Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should
not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the
Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to
her conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third-Degree
Felony, shall serve a term of imprisonment for a period of one ( 1) to fifteen ( 15) years in the
Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah Department of
Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, VICTORIA FANTON, and pursuant to
her conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third-Degree
Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum and amount often thousand dollars ($10,000), plus a ninety
percent (90%) surcharge, and a court security fee in the sum and amount of thirty-three dollars
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($33).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be setved
concurrently with the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 141500783.
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the terms of incarceration imposed and
the fines imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation.
ORDER OF PROBATION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
VICTORIA FANTON, is hereby placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months under
the supetvision of the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, strictly within the
following terms, provisions, and conditions:
I.

The Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a formal agreement provided by

the Utah Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and during the period of probation set forth
herein, shall strictly conform with all the terms, provisions, and conditions, and the same are
hereby made a part of this Order by means of incorporation.
2.

The Defendant shall report as ordered and required by the Court and the

Department of Adult Probation and Parole during the period of this probation.
3.

The Defendant shall commit no law violations during the period of this probation.

4.

The Defendant shall pay a court security fee in the amount of thirty-three dollars

($33), during the period of probation and under the direction of Adult Probation and Parole.
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5.

The Defendant shall abide by all terms and conditions of probation as ordered in

Criminal Case No. 141500783.
END OF ORDER
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